w x In a series of influential papers, Varian 21 , 25 extended and refined the work of w x w x w x w x Afriat 1, 2 , Samuelson 20 , Houthakker 12 , and Richter 19 , among others, to form the basis for a series of empirically testable hypotheses known generally as the theory of revealed preference. This work demonstrates how observed demand behavior can be used to recover information about an individual's preference ordering without resorting to parametric assumptions regarding the form of the consumer's underlying demand or utility function. Revealed preference theory has w x been influential in developing empirical tests of utility theory 21, 23 , investigating w x issues of changes in consumer's tastes 5 , and testing whether firms behave as w x profit maximizers 24 , as well as a variety of other applications. The ability to characterize information about consumer's preferences without imposing a specific functional form for utility or demand is intuitively appealing and has provided a rich base for empirical research in consumer and firm theory.
The issue of parametric specification has been of widespread concern in nonmarket valuation. Most nonmarket valuation methods require the analyst to specify Ž a particular functional form for an estimating equation e.g., a demand, bid, utility, . or hedonic price function . Although the analyst may perform goodness of fit tests or use other tools to choose among functional forms, there remains a great deal of arbitrariness and researcher judgment in the choice of functional form.
A second limitation of standard nonmarket valuation methods is the need to assume that the underlying preference structure is identical across all individuals in the sample. Although individual characteristics can be entered as explanatory variables, it is still necessary to assume that the functional relationship between all variables is the same for all observations.
In the travel cost model, it has long been understood that the choice of functional form for either the demand function or the indirect utility function can have significant consequences for the magnitude of the resulting welfare estimates w x w 13, 18, 26 . The same has been found in random utility models of recreation 11, x w x 15, 17 and hedonic housing models used to value air quality 7 . Finally, the contingent valuation literature has found that changes in either the error structure or the assumed bid function's form can yield large differences in valuation w x estimates from discrete choice formats 10 . In all of these cases, a common preference structure is assumed across observations. Given this sensitivity to functional form, it is natural to consider whether nonparametric methods such as those refined and developed by Varian might be of value in nonmarket welfare analysis.
In this research, we begin by adapting Varian's work on bounding welfare measures to the task of valuing nonmarket commodities. Unfortunately, Varian's bounds based on a single pricerquantity combination for each individual may be too wide to be of value. To remedy this, we develop narrower bounds that can be derived if the analyst has additional data on optimal market bundles at new prices. Our procedures differ from Varian's in that we exploit the theoretical relationship between compensating variation and equivalent variation. The exciting aspect of Ž . this work like Varian's is that these bounds are derived using only quantity and price information and without any parametric assumption on demand or utility. 2 Further, we derive a unique bound for each observation in the sample, thus making no assumptions about the similarity of preferences across individuals. Consequently, we obtain nonparametric bounds for each individual in the sample that must bound the true welfare change, unless the data itself is incorrect.
To investigate the potential empirical value of the bounds, we conduct a Monte Carlo experiment. In this experiment, the nonparametric lower and upper bounds are compared to simulated ''true'' values of WTP using simulated data sets. Additionally, we consider how well the bounds perform in estimating welfare relative to traditional parametric approaches. To do so, traditional travel cost type models are estimated on the simulated data sets and point estimates and confidence intervals are constructed from these models which are then compared to the nonparametric bounds. w x w x In the recreation demand literature, Boxall et al. 4 , and Larson et al. 16 have used Varian's methodology to test for consistency between contingent valuation Ž . Ž . stated preference models and recreation demand revealed preference models. Here, we use and extend the methodology to actually provide information on the magnitude of welfare changes for nonmarket goods.
2 Ž However, the analyst must know whether the income effect is positive or negative more will be said . on this point later .
USING OBSERVED DATA TO COMPUTE BOUNDS ON THE WTP FOR PRICE CHANGES

Bounds Based on One Data Point for Each Indi¨idual
To begin, assume that the analyst has a single pricerquantity observation for each sample observation. Varian's seminal work demonstrates how bounds on each individual's compensating variation for a proposed price change can be constructed. Consider a simple budget constraint for an individual choosing between Ž . Ž . Ž . recreation visits¨and a composite commodity z . In Fig. 1 , X '¨, z 0 0 0 Ž denotes the chosen commodity bundle at the initial price vector denoted P in the 0 .
ÄŽ . 4 figure and M is the consumer's income. Let X '¨, z :¨, z g R be the set of q all possible bundles.
Ž . Compensating variation CV associated with a price change is CV s e P , U y e P , U Ž . Ž .
where e P, U denotes the individual's expenditure function, U '¨, z denotes 0 0 0 the level of utility at X , and P and P are the prices before and after the price 0 0 N Ž . change. If we can provide bounds on the second term, e P , U , we can also N 0 bound CV. We now ask the question: What is the most amount of income we can take away from or give to this individual after a price change to be sure that he or she can attain the original level of utility? Suppose, as depicted in Fig. 1 , we are interested in the CV for a price decrease from P to P , where P represents the budget 0 N 0 constraint at the initial prices and P represents the new budget constraint.
N
We know the individual can at least attain his or her initial level of utility if he or she can afford his or her initial bundle. This upper bound on expenditure is
Graphically, M can be identified as the vertical intercept of a straight line CV Ž . parallel to P that intersects X the dashed line through X in Fig. 1 . If the N 0 0 0 consumer views¨and z as perfect complements, M is exactly equal to the CV expenditure necessary to attain the original level of utility at the new prices, otherwise it is an upper bound. Following this logic, the least expenditure that could be required to maintain the original level of utility after the price change would occur if the goods were perfect Ž . substitutes straight line indifference curves . In this case, income can be taken away from or given to the consumer until he or she would pick the corner solution that minimizes expenditures. Graphically, the lower bound on expenditure can be identified with a straight line drawn parallel to P that intersects the vertical
Combining the upper and lower bounds on expenditure, we get bounds on CV:
The superscript on the LHS and the expenditure bounds reflects the fact that these Ž bounds are constructed knowing only a single data point the original commodity . bundle . Note that the lower bound on expenditure determines the upper bound on CV and vice versa. The proximity of CV to the bounds depends upon the degree of substitutability between the goods. If the goods are perfect substitutes, CV will exactly equal the upper bound. Conversely, if the goods are perfect complements, CV is exactly the lower bound.
Bounds Based on Two Data Points for Each Indi¨idual
We can improve upon Varian's bounds with additional data by appealing to the properties of Hicksian welfare measures. Suppose that in addition to knowing the optimal bundle chosen by the consumer at the original prices, the analyst also knows the optimal bundle chosen by the individual at the new prices. A second pricerquantity vector might be obtained for an actual sample in at least two different ways. First, analysts might collect data on use over two seasons or time periods. In this case, the analyst would have two consumption bundles at two sets Ž . of prices based on revealed preference data. Alternatively and more likely , Ž . contingent behavior stated preference data could be combined with the revealed preference data to generate the second data point.
Regardless of the source of this second data point, the question of interest is: does the addition of this information help us tighten the bounds on CV for a price change from P to P ? Suppose that the consumer reveals to the researcher that 0 N Ž . X is or would be his chosen commodity bundle at prices P . This information N N Ž . allows us to compute bounds on the equivalent variation EV for the price change from P to P . By appealing to the fact that the EV for a price decrease for a 0 N normal good is greater than or equal to the CV for the same price decrease, we can potentially tighten the upper bound on CV by using the upper bound on EV in its place. Equivalent variation for the price decrease is defined as
If we can bound the first term, we can bound the equivalent variation. The exact EV could be obtained if we knew exactly how much money we would need to give Ž . Ž . the consumer at the initial prices P to achieve the utility at X see However, unless the consumer is unwilling to substitute any z for¨, the consumer will be able to achieve the same level of utility that X provides at less N than this level of compensation. What is the least amount of compensation that might allow the consumer to obtain the same utility as provide by X ? If z andN are perfect substitutes and an interior solution is observed, the indifference curve between them would be a straight line and would be identical to the budget line defined by P . In this case, the consumer would need only his or her original N income to achieve the new utility level. Thus, the lower bound on EV is simply M N y M s 0. Unfortunately, a lower bound of zero is not particularly informa-EV tive. Nevertheless, we can now bound EV as follows,
where the superscript ''N '' indicates that only the second data point is used to construct these bounds. Since EV for a price decline is greater than CV, we know that an upper bound on EV must also be an upper bound on the CV. The bounds on CV derived using information from both data points can be written
The superscripts on B indicate that both points are used to infer the bounds. As pointed out initially, these results apply only for a normal good. In some cases, this may be a problematic assumption, as empirical research on recreation goods has found evidence of negative income effects. However, if the analyst knows that the good is inferior, the relationship between CV and EV can still be used to tighten the bounds. In this case, CV exceeds EV, so the EV provides a tighter lower bound. Thus, it is not necessary that the good be normal, only that the analyst know whether the good is normal or inferior. If a priori the analyst is in doubt as to the sign of the income effect, a pragmatic approach would be to estimate several parametric demand specifications with the goal of signing the income effect. If the results of alternative specifications consistently yield a positive or negative sign, the analyst can proceed. If such an exercise yields inconclusive evidence, the analyst might compute the welfare bounds under both assumptions and compare their magnitudes.
Bounds Based on Three or More Data Points for Each Indi¨idual
Now suppose that the analyst knows yet a third price᎐quantity combination for each individual and suppose that that combination corresponds to a price ratio that lies between the initial and proposed price change. To see how this point may raise the lower bound, turn to Fig. 2 where we have depicted the original and new Ž . budget constraints P and P and the corresponding optimal commodity bundles 0 N Ž . X and X . An intermediate budget constraint and an associated optimal bundle 0 N is labeled X .
1
FIGURE 2
As drawn, knowledge that X is the optimal commodity bundle at prices P 1 1 allows us to increase the amount of income that can be taken away from the consumer and still be sure that the original utility level is obtained, thus increasing the lower bound on CV. To see this, note that since X is chosen at P when X
was affordable, we know that X represents a higher level of utility than X and 1 0 lies on a higher indifference curve than X . This, in turn, implies that if income 0 Ž . were taken away from the consumer at the new set of prices P until the N consumer could afford X , he or she would still be obtaining at least as much 1 1 utility as at X . Thus, an expenditure level of M is sufficient to ensure that the 0 C V consumer is no worse off than the original utility level. We can write our newly formulated lower bounds that are based on information from three data points as
The addition of this third data point can also lower the upper bound on CV. Specifically, with a third data point, the new upper bound can be written
To demonstrate that this constitutes an upper bound, appeal again to the fact that the EV for a price decrease is greater than the CV for the same price decrease.
Then,
Ž . The second inequality in 9 follows from the fact that the expenditure necessary to Ž . achieve U at the initial prices P must be less than or equal to the expenditure 1 0 that would be required to allow the consumer to purchase the commodity bundle that achieves U at prices P . Based on identical reasoning, the following inequali- 1 1 ties hold:
Ž . Summing 9 and 10 yields e P , U y e P , U F P y P¨q P y P¨,
Not all intermediate price ratios will provide information that can be used to raise the lower bounds. Consumption bundles that do raise the lower bound will be generated only when the consumer's preferences generate backward bending offer curves such that the new consumption bundle is cheaper than the original bundle at the new prices.
which establishes the new upper bound. The reasoning can be extended indefinitely so that each additional data point will further lower the upper bound. This new upper bound is strictly less than the potential upper bound determined by EV, i.e.,
It is now possible to write lower and upper bounds associated with three data points,
Additional data points can be used in like manner to further tighten the bounds. Ž . Although their accuracy is certain subject only to error in the underlying data , the ultimate value of these bounds depends on their width. Bounds that are very wide will provide too little information for a policy analyst and will likely be passed over in favor of parametric estimates that provide at least the appearance of precision to those who use this information. If parametric methods can be accurately estimated andror if the nonparametric bounds are quite wide, there is little reason to pursue research employing the nonparametric bounds. Alternatively, if nonparametric bounds are found to have the potential to be relatively narrow in practice andror if parametric methods generate significant error in welfare measurement then nonparametric bounds may have an important role to play in welfare analysis.
A MONTE CARLO STUDY
Design of the Study
Ž .
The Monte Carlo experiment is designed with these three questions in mind: 1 Ž . How narrow can we expect the nonparametric bounds to be? 2 How much does Ž . Ž . the addition of data points improve tighten the bounds? 3 How do the nonparametric bounds compare to welfare estimates generated by parametric estimators?
In the previous section, the lower bound on CV was seen to exactly equal the true CV when the two goods were perfect complements and the upper bound was exactly the true CV when the two goods were perfect substitutes. These results make it clear that the accuracy of the bounds is affected by the degree of substitutability between the good whose price change is being evaluated and the numeraire. To consider alternative degrees of substitution possibilities easily, we Ž . employ a constant elasticity of substitution CES utility function
w Ž .x where s ' 1r 1 y , z is a numeraire,¨is the quantity of the environmental Ž . good, and ␣ are parameters, and ; Uniform y0.25, 0.25 is the error term. The CES is a convenient utility function to work with since the single parameter, s, determines the degree of substitutability between the goods. Then, the true form of demand is given by
We set the parameter ␣ s 0.75. To examine the sensitivity of the results to the degree of substitution, we investigate four different values of s: s s 0.5, 2, 5, and 20. Using this utility function and parameter values, we generate 1000 samples of 300 observations each. For each observation, the simulated price is randomly Ž . drawn from the uniform distribution on the interval 5, 55 . Also, income is Ž . randomly drawn from the uniform distribution on the interval 5000, 85,000 .
How Tight Are the Nonparametric Bounds and How Much Do Additional Data Points Impro¨e the Bounds?
As demonstrated in the theoretical sections above, bounds on welfare measures can be constructed with a single data point, two data points, or three or more points for each individual. In the first part of the Monte Carlo experiment, we Ž . investigate how the addition of data points observations for each individual in the sample can narrow the bounds. As mentioned earlier, one possible source for such additional observations is via contingent behavior. Although those who are suspicious of contingent valuation as a reliable valuation method may discount such data, some analysts may be more comfortable with behavioral contingent data than w x willingness to pay questions. For example, Bockstael and McConnell 3 have recently argued that:
Such contingent behavior studies might not suffer from many of the problems encountered when asking values and they would be targeted towards people who ''behave'' in the context of the problem and who would presumably not find it difficult to imagine the behavioral changes they would make when faced with different prices, different qualities, different w x alternatives. p. 29
If contingent behavior is viewed as a reliable source of data and if nonparametric bounds can be constructed from this data that are sufficiently narrow to be of practical use, there might be a potentially compelling case for their use in place of parametric estimates. A Monte Carlo experiment where there is assumed to be no measurement error associated with the data is an ideal environment to shed light on this question. For, if the nonparametric bounds are too wide to be of policy interest in this setting, they can almost certainly be ruled out as a viable strategy when the vagaries of real data are considered.
To assess the gains from adding contingent behavior data to a single observed data point for each observation, we first compute the nonparametric bounds for each Monte Carlo sample based on a single data point and average the lower and upper bounds. This process is repeated for each of the samples. 5 This is equivalent 5 Since the CV for a price decrease is identical to the EV for the inverse price increase, the values in the tables can be interpreted as bounds on either measure; however, we will refer to it as a bound on CV for simplicity. Tables 1a and 1b we report the bounds generated by this procedure. Results are presented for two different price changes: Ž a 25% decrease and an 80% decrease and four different values of s the . substitutability parameter .
As can quickly be seen, the range between the lower and upper bound is enormous in all cases and thus of no real value from an applied policy perspective. This is not surprising as a single data point per individual provides little information. In the rows marked ''Point N '', a second data point for each individual is Ž . used along with the first to form the bounds. This point corresponds to the quantity chosen by the individual at the ''new'' price; i.e., it corresponds to point ''N '' in Figs. 1 and 2 from the theoretical discussion. With the introduction of this second point, the upper bound on the compensating variation drops dramatically in all cases.
In the row marked ''Point 1'', the third data point is used to raise the lower bound and lower the upper bound as described in the theory section above. The third data point is generated in the Monte Carlo study by determining the quantity consumed at the midpoint price between the initial and final price in the welfare change. Although the gains in tightening the interval are not nearly as large as the addition of the second point, it is clear that valuable gains are possible. In a number of cases, the conditions necessary to raise the lower bound are present, thus the addition of the third data point both raises the lower bound and lowers the upper bound. However, even when the lower bound remains unchanged, the range between the lower and upper bound is small enough to be of use in certain policy situations.
In the rows marked ''Point 2'' and ''Point 3,'' two additional pricerquantity combinations are used to tighten the bounds. These combinations are determined by computing the midpoints between the point 1 price and the initial price and the final and the initial price, respectively. Again, the nonparametric bounds are potentially tightened by this additional information. The gains come primarily from lowering the upper bound on WTP. As noted above, each new data point will necessarily lower the upper bound as we are able to trace out the individuals' demand function. If we learn of every commodity bundle the individual would choose for all intermediate prices, our upper bound on WTP would be precisely the individual's Marshallian consumer surplus.
Our ability to raise the lower bound hinges on the shape of the individual's offer-curve. Specifically, if the offer-curve is backward-bending for some intermediate price changes and we learn of commodity bundles chosen at these prices, then we may raise the lower bound on WTP. A backward-bending offer-curve is a necessary but not sufficient condition for raising the lower bound.
These Monte Carlo results strongly suggest that with the addition of at least one and possibly several more data points, nonparametric bounds can be constructed that are narrow enough to be truly informative to a policy maker. Next, we consider how these bounds compare to parametric estimates generated by the same amount of information.
How Do the Nonparametric Bounds Compare to Standard Parametric Estimates?
For purposes of this portion of the Monte Carlo study, we assume that the researcher has access to a data set with three data points for each individual in the sample, corresponding to points O, N, and 1 from the previous section. Again, we have in mind that the researcher may have undertaken a contingent behavior survey to collect such data. Here we ask how well the researcher could do with such a data set in estimating CV using the nonparametric bounds relative to Ž . employing a parametric demand model such as a typical travel cost type model .
For each sample, we estimate each of the three standard parametric demand functions
where the greek letters again correspond to parameters. These demand functions were chosen due to their common use in recreation demand modeling. We also w x estimate a flexible functional form, the Fourier form 6, 8, 9 . This flexible form was included to compare the nonparametric bounds to a less restrictive demand function than the standard forms. The details concerning the Fourier form are provided in the Appendix.
To estimate the models, we include all three data points for each individual that are used in constructing the nonparametric bounds. Thus, the original point plus the ''contingent behavior'' data are used in constructing both the nonparametric bounds and the parametric estimates. In this way, the parametric and nonparametric methods are both confronted with the same amount of information. To incorporate the fact that the three observations for each individual are not 
Models Ž. j, k index date points , we estimate the models in 16 and the Fourier form using a standard feasible generalized least square estimators to capture this correlation. 7 After estimating each model, we calculate the average estimated CV for each functional form and do so for each of the 1000 repetitions. Next, we order the respective averages from smallest to largest and construct empirical 95% confidence intervals for each method.
To provide a benchmark against which to compare both the nonparametric bounds and the parametric estimates, we compute the true CV for a proposed price decrease and average these over all individuals in the simulated samples and Ž . over the 1000 Monte Carlo trials reported in the last row of the tables . We also order the distribution of the 1000 sample average CVs from highest to lowest and identify the 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles of that distribution. This provides the 95% sampling confidence interval against which the parametric confidence intervals and the nonparametric bounds can be assessed. Thus, this interval represents the true sampling variability and therefore provides the appropriate comparison for each of the demand models.
Tables IIa and IIb contain the point estimates, confidence intervals, nonparametric bounds, and average sample CV for the simulated data for a 25 and 80% price reduction, respectively. We also report the average R 2 's for the parametric estimates to provide a sense of the goodness-of-fit of the parametric models to the Ž . data and thus how ''typical'' these scenarios might be . First note that the nonparametric bounds are indeed true bounds on the sample intervals. In contrast, Ž . the parametric bounds confidence intervals are not.
In this case, there is no parametric demand function that is an exact match for the true demand function, although the log-linear represents a special case of the CES demand. However, the situation where the ''true'' demand functions are not an exact match to the parametric specification strikes us as the most accurate representation of a typical study. Although none of the forms is an exact match, the Fourier form has been shown to consistently estimate the true underlying w x demand function up to a finite order globally 9, 6 .
Not surprisingly, there are a number of estimated confidence intervals that lie Ž . within the true sample intervals i.e., they are too narrow . Even more strikingly, in some cases the point estimates from the estimated demand models lie outside of the true sample interval. For example, in Table IIa , fully half of the cases fall into this situation. Thus, by using a parametric point estimate an analyst might actually be reporting a welfare measure that is not even within the true 95% sample interval.
The flexible functional form results range from outperforming the standard parametric models to underperforming all but the linear model in terms of goodness of fit. Even in the case where the flexible form appears to fit best, it still Ž Ž. . misses 84% of the sampling confidence interval see Table II This of course is not news to applied researchers: incorrect functional forms are well known to potentially generate welfare measures with large error. More to the point is that an alternative that does not require assuming a particular functional form exists and generates ranges that, at least in some cases, are likely to be narrow enough for policy making.
Nonparametric Bounds and Standard Parametric Estimators When the Population Preference Structure Is Heterogeneous
An even more realistic situation than one in which recreationists have random parameters, but share the same functional form for utility is one in which the population consists of individuals with different utility structures. To consider this situation, we allow the population we are sampling from to consist of some individuals with semilog-demand utility and some with CES utility. Each type comprises 50% of the population. The semi-log demand utility function is
Ž .
here greek letters indicate parameters. The parameter values in the semilog utility function are set at ␣ s 2, ␤ s y0.004, and ␥ s 0.000 02. 8 The stochastic the Fourier form. This is particularly interesting in the case of the semilog demand specification where the average values estimated are quite close to the simulated ''truth,'' but the confidence intervals still exclude the mean. In contrast, the nonparametric bounds are true bounds and for this particular parameterization are quite tight.
As a final measure of the value of the nonparametric bounds, we compute the mean percent error associated with using the midpoint of the nonparametric bounds as an estimate of the average WTP. These statistics range from y10.2 to q6.2% with an average of y4.4%. We believe that these results provide a rather compelling case for further investigation of nonparametric methods in nonmarket valuation.
FINAL REMARKS ON THE VALUE OF NONPARAMETRIC BOUNDS ON WELFARE MEASURES
In this paper, we have presented simple methods for constructing nonparametric bounds on compensating or equivalent variation for price changes based on nonparametric methods. We began with the methods developed by Varian and derived additional results allowing significant tightening of the bounds. These bounds have the potential to provide an alternative valuation method to standard parametric estimation of recreation demand. Instead of presenting an average point estimate that is conditional on a particular parametric form, analysts employing nonparametric bounds can report average lower and upper bounds that are accurate regardless of the true preference structure.
The ultimate usefulness of the bounds derived here will depend upon how tightly the bounds can be constructed for real data and on whether the data necessary to compute such bounds can be obtained and deemed reliable. In our Monte Carlo analysis, we have demonstrated that there are situations under which the first of these conditions will hold: bounds constructed without reference to parametric demand specifications can yield intervals that are narrow enough for policy purposes. However, questions concerning the reliability of contingent behavior data or the possibilities of collecting time series data must await the confrontation of a real data set.
To apply the bounds, the analyst must know whether the good is inferior or normal. This is a potential limitation, but the issue is no less troublesome for parametric models which impose a common functional relationship between income and demand.
Bounds on welfare measures associated with price changes might be extended to valuing a quality change by bounding a price change at a higher level of environmental quality and subtracting the bounds for the price change at a lower level of environmental quality. The introduction of a new recreation site might be valued by assuming that a new site is a perfect substitute for an existing site. Under this assumption, the introduction of the perfect substitute can be modeled as a price decrease when the substitute costs less than the original good. The bounds derived here are then directly applicable.
Nonparametric bounds on welfare measures are appealing in that they require no assumptions about utility functions or error structures. Equally importantly, they do not require assuming that all individuals in a sample have the same preference structures or parameter values. Such liberty is heartening, but comes at a cost. Rather than being able to report precise-sounding estimates of welfare, bounds convey uncertainty. However, as the results of these Monte Carlo experiments suggest, the ''certainty'' conveyed by point estimates from traditional parametric estimators may be misleading.
The results developed here using nonparametric bounds constitute a first look at applying nonparametric methods to bound welfare measures for nonmarket goods. Based on the theoretical and simulated results presented here, we are optimistic that additional work in this area will yield substantial returns. Issues worthy of additional attention include extension to multiple sites and the implications of errors in the data for welfare bounds. Ž . Finally, Creel 1997 observes that, in practice, J is usually 1 or 2. Thus, to be consistent with the best recommendations of the applied literature, we set J s 1, A s 1, and the length of the elementary index to 2. Further exploration of the implications of these choices for specific applications would undoubtedly be quite useful.
